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A NEW DRAMSHOP ACT
Georgia Luks
I. Purpose
The purpose of this legislation is to limit the liability
of educational institutions of higher learning to situ-
ations where those institutions have made a knowing and
willful violation of the laws pertaining to control of al-
coholic beverages.
II. Existing Law In Indiana
At common law, any person who furnished alcoholic beverages
to minors or intoxicated persons in violation of the law
was not liable for any resultant injuries sustained by third
persons. This was true in Indiana until a Dramshop Act was
passed in 1853. This Act was repealed two years later.
ABA Sect. of Ins. Neg. & Comp. Law 448, 449 (1967). It is
worthy to note that the Indiana Dramshop Act of 1853 stated
that the vendor of alcoholic beverages would be liable; how-
ever, the law did not refer to the social host.
The leading case holding a seller of alcoholic beverages
liable for injuries sustained by third persons is Elder v.
Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E. 2d 847 (1966); (hereinafter
cited as Elder). The court in Elder stated that Sec. 20,
Ch. 13 of Acts of Ind. Gen. Assembly of 1875, which provides
for "civil liability . . . to any person who shall sustain
any injury. . . ." had been repealed because later Acts of
Ind. purport to cover the entire field of regulation of al-
coholic beverages. Id. at 600, 217 N.E. 2d at 848.
In Elder the court also held that at common law, a violation
of a statute intended to provide for the safety of the public,
is negligence per se. The Court in Elder determined this by
using an Illinois interpretation of Indiana common law. See
Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E., 2d 292
(1963).
The court extended Elder to find liability of a social host
in Brattain v. Herron, 41 Ind. Dec. 341, 309 N.E. 2d 150
(Ind. Ct. App. 1974); (hereinafter cited as Brattain).
In Brattain, the defendant was found to have violated the law
forbidding persons "to sell, barter, exchange, provide or
furnish an alcoholic beverage to a minor." IC 1971, 7.1-
5-7-8. The court construed the defendant's failure to object
to her minor brother's consumption of alcohol in her home as
providing or furnishing an alcoholic beverage within the
meaning of the terms used in IC 1971, 7.1-5-7-8. Conse-
quently, after the minor had an auto accident a short time
later, the court found the defendant civilly liable for the
damages incurred. The court in Brattain held that where a
person knowingly gave alcoholic beverages to a person who
was known to be a minor, with knowledge that a minor would
be driving on a public highway, that person is liable for
any injuries sustained by third persons.
III. Implications of Existing Law in Indiana
A. Social Host Should Not be Held Liable for Torts
Committed by Guests Unless the Social Host
Knowingly Violated the Law
The motivating force behind the enactment of most Dramshop
laws was the control of the sale of alcoholic beverages.
Comment: Application of Dramshop Acts to Non-Commercial
Suppliers of Liquor, 1973 Wash. U.L.Q. 708, 710.
Generally, it is determined that it is impractical to hold
a social host liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages.
Since the tavern keeper receives pecuniary gain for pro-
viding alcoholic beverages to his customers, it is logi-
cal to shift the cost of damage to the vendor because the
tavern keeper has a greater capacity to absorb the cost.
Any cost of insurance or a bond can be passed on to his
customers. However the social host must personally ab-
sorb the cost of any insurance, if it is available to
him.
Unlike the tavern keeper, the social host does not
necessarily physically confront every person who consumes
alcoholic beverages in his home; the guest often merely
serves himself. (This was the situation in Brattain.)
The social host is not as effective in policing the
activities of his guests. Thus, the social host has lesser
means available for protection against liability and fi-
nancial ruination. See Note: EXTENSION OF THE DRAMSHOP
ACT: NEW FOUND LIABILITY OF THE SOCIAL HOST, 49 N.D.L.
Rev. 67, 80 (1972).
Should the social host be aware of his liability, in the
absence of the Dramshop Act, he may be unable to get
adequate insurance due to either the prohibitive costs
or the insurer's refusal to insure the private person
against virtually unlimited liability.
The cases which have found the social host liable for
torts committed by its guest in consequence of furnish-
ing alcoholic beverages, have all expressly or impliedly
required that the host knowingly violated the law, that is
knowingly furnished alcohol to a person that he must have
known was a minor or must have known was inebriated. See
e.g., Brattain, p. 2 supra. (The defendant knew that her
younger brother was a minor and knew that he would be
driving on the public highway.); Weiner v. Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, 485 p. 2d 18 (Ore. 1971) (where the defendant
Fraternity served a person whom it knew to be a minor);
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d, 87
100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972) (where the defendant employer not
only served a minor-employee a large amount of liquor, but
also placed him in a car and directed him to drive the auto-
mobile through traffic).
B. Brattain Could be Extended to Unknowing Violations
of the Law
The liability of the social host has been predicated on
several theories. First, in applying a Dramshop Act, a
court could find the defendant negligent if he knowingly
served a minor under circumstances in which the unreasonable
conduct of the guest is foreseeable.
See Wiener v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, supra. Second,
liability may be found by analogy to the negligent entrust-
ment doctrine. This was advanced by Judge Dooling in his
dissenting opinion in Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d
246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949). That is, it is negligence to
furnish liquor to a minor or any persons to the point of
intoxication knowing that he is going to drive an automo-
bile while in that condition. Id. at 253, 210 P.2d at 535.
Third, is the theory advanced by Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd
Motor Co., p. 4 supra; and followed by Brattain p. 2 supra.
In these cases the courts of California and Indiana found
that the defendant breached a duty to the person injured
not by knowingly serving a person known to be a minor or
known to be an inebriant but by violation of the law; and
that a violation of a law pertaining to the safety of the
population is negligence per se. See Elder v. Fisher, p. 1
supra. It is worthy to note that IC 1971, 7.1-5-7-8 does
not require the social host to know that the person served
is a minor in order to have a violation thereof. It is also
worthy to note that in Brattain, the defendant did not
actually serve her younger brother alcoholic beverages, but
merely did not object to his drinking.
Since at common law a violation of a statute intended to
provide safety of the public is negligence per se; and
the law pertaining to serving alcohol to minors does not
require the server to know that the person being furnished
alcohol is a minor, it is conceivable that Brattain could
be extended to unknowing violations of the law.
C. It Is Virtually Impossible for a Large Institution
to Totally Prevent the Consumption of Alcohol
No matter how rigid the campus rules are regarding the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages there will always be those
who will violate those rules. The probability of violations
occurring is increased by the fact that a high percentage
of persons pursuing post secondary education are legally
allowed to drink. The flagrant violations of the Prohibition
Amendment should only serve to evidence the fact that there
are those who will drink despite the law. Universities and
colleges can attempt to protect themselves from liability.
However, the state should not hold these institutions re-
sponsible for the-acts of one of its errant students where
it is impossible to control or observe those acts.
Note that Illinois and Vermont have statutes which state
that the owner or lessor of a building who knowingly per-
mits sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises is person-
ally liable to the same extent as the tavern keeper. Annot.
169 A.L.R. 1203 (1947). Since liability of the vendor and
social host, as derived from common law is, in essence,
strict liability, it is virtually unlimited. That is, there
is no requirement that the institution knowingly permit
alcoholic beverages to be served to persons known to be
minors, in order to incur liability. Therefore, the follow-
ing legislation should be enacted to predicate the liability
of an educational institution of higher learning for torts
committed in consequence of a violation of the laws pertain-
ing to regulation of alcoholic beverages, only where that
violation was willful.
A BILL FOR AN ACT to amend IC 1971, 7.1-5-7-8 concerning
the liability of educational institutions of higher
learning for certain illegal sales of alcoholic
beverages.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana:
SECTION 1. IC 1971, 7.1-5-7-8 as added by Acts 1973,
P.L. 55, SECTION 1, is amended to read as follows: Sec. 8.
(a) It is unlawful for a person to sell, barter, exchange,
provide or furnish an alcoholic beverage to a minor.
(b) This section shall not be construed to impose civil
liability upon any educational institution of higher learning,
including but not limited to public and private universities
and colleges, business schools, vocational schools, and
schools for continuing education, or its agents for injury
to any person or property sustained in consequence of a
violation of this section unless such institution or its
agent sells, barters, exchanges, provides or furnishes an
alcoholic beverage to a minor.
